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In the course of technological evolution security markets offer 
low-latency access to their customers. Although latency figures 
are used as marketing instruments, only little research sheds 
light on the means of those figures. This paper provides a 
performance measure on the effect of latency in the context of the 
competitive advantage of IT. Based on a historical dataset of 
Deutsche Börse’s electronic trading system Xetra an empirical 
analysis is applied. That way we quantify and qualify the impact 
of latency from a customer’s point of view. 
Keywords 
Securities Trading, Latency, Error Rate Estimation, Performance 
Measurement. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Competition among European exchanges has been significantly 
fueled: in November 2007 the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID) became effective. With MiFID the European 
Commission aimed at fostering competition and at increasing 
transparency in securities trading. Before this date, trading was 
concentrated at national exchanges in Europe [1] which faced 
nearly no national competitors. 
MiFID enabled the entry of new competitors for traditional 
exchanges. Increasing trading volumes [2] of these so called 
Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTF) force exchange operators 
to focus more on the needs of their customers (market 
participants): these are retail and institutional investors. Market 
operators aim at attracting customers on their trading systems. 
On top of different pricing schemes they compete through special 
services such as low latency access. That way they account for 
the fact that “[l]atency is one of the major issues in today’s 
trading business” [3, p. 1]. 
In general trading can be defined as the act of transferring an 
investment decisions into actual portfolio positions. Thereby 
sophisticated trading plans for the slicing and timing of 
individual orders as well as their precise realization are 
imperative success factors for exchange customers [4]. On the 
one hand portfolio turnovers often require the simultaneous 
coordination of transactions in multiple instruments to minimize 
implementation risks. On the other hand execution performance 
is evaluated by benchmarks based on market prices available at 
the time of the investment decision or during the time span for 
entering or closing the targeted position. Thus a successful 
market participant (trader) is supposed to “sense a market, spot 
pricing discrepancies, and make lightning-fast decisions” [1, p. 
60]. 
Concerning these requirements for fast reactions, market setups 
based solely on manual trading floors are restricted mainly by 
human traders’ limited capacity of reaction and perception. For 
such markets latencies, i.e. the time which elapses from the 
emergence of a new trade opportunity and the actual order arrival 
at the market, correspond to multiple seconds. The reduction of 
this time period by employing IT is said to exhibit positive 
effects already since the 1980s [5]. 
Among other efficiency improvements triggered by IT the most 
notable has been the shift from floor trading to electronic trading 
systems [6, 7]. The electronification of market venues in Europe, 
i.e. exchange trading systems like Xetra (Deutsche Börse), SETS 
(London Stock Exchange) or NSC (Euronext France) took place 
in the late 1990s and enabled market participants to access 
electronic order books1 via remote access without the need for 
physical presence on an exchange floor [1]. This so called Direct 
Market Access allows straight through processing for accessing 
securities markets which reduces the necessity of media breaks 
and manual human interventions [8]. Beyond these benefits it 
enables algorithmic trading engines which simulate order placing 
strategies of human traders to enter or close portfolio positions. 
A typical example is to reach the Volume Weighted Average 
Price (VWAP) when buying or selling an instrument. 
                                                             
1 A list of buy and sell orders for a specific instrument sorted by 
price/time priority. Each update might change its structure, i.e. 
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Deutsche Börse reports 45 % of transactions on Xetra to 
originate from algorithms in Q1/2009 and to be still increasing 
[9]. The rational for the success of algorithmic trading is 
plentiful: firstly, algorithms allow overall cost savings in 
comparison to human brokers [10]. Secondly, they break human 
limitations and thus allow permanent surveillance of outstanding 
orders. This capability allows algorithms to readjust their trading 
decisions “immediately” to changing market conditions – i.e. 
retain their unexecuted orders at best market prices (top of the 
book) [11]. Besides, algorithms have been proven to substantially 
improve market liquidity, though the effects of HFT on welfare 
are ambiguous [12]. I.e. they post passive limit orders and thus 
provide trade opportunities to potential counterparties in times 
when they are scarce. 
Institutional investors which generate most trading volume [1] 
exhibit an increasing need for algorithmic trading. Therefore 
their trading needs became the focus of market operators which 
have entered an arms race for low latencies [13]. Typically they 
offer so called co-location or proximity services: here the latency 
to send orders from the clients’ office location is eliminated by 
hosting these clients’ trading algorithms on servers nearby the 
marketplace’s system. Table 1 depicts exemplary latencies from 
October 2008 used in promotion by the MTF Chi-X Europe. 
Table 1. Latencies for Direct Market Assess from [14] 
Market Place Average Latency [ms] 
Chi-X Europe 0.4 (co-located) 
London Stock Exchange < 6 
Euronext 13 
Deutsche Börse 37 
OMX 43 
 
Additional to algorithmic trading, which is designed to enter or 
close stock position based on the decisions from portfolio 
management, the electronification of trading paved the way for 
another kind of quantitative trading strategy [15]: so called high-
frequency traders (HFT) basically aim at taking advantage from 
short-timed market inefficiencies. In this respect HFT trades are 
triggered by computer systems as immediate reactions to 
changing market conditions. That way they perform a vast 
number of trades with relatively low profits. The price 
discrepancies HFT strategies are based on are only restricted to 
leave a gain over after trading costs. According to [16] HFT 
margins in the US are as low as 0.1 cent per share (cps) after 
trading costs while typical brokerage services amount to 1-5 cps 
[16]. 
Another distinctive feature of the high monetary turnovers of 
HFTs is their short position holding times: typically not more 
than hours or even just seconds. On top, over-night positions are 
avoided. A typical evolution of the cumulated inventory changes 
of a HFT acting as a market-maker or middleman at the MTF 
Chi-X Europe as well as Euronext simultaneously is depicted in 
Figure1. Similar to a classical money changer market-making is 
designed to earn the price difference from buy (bid) and sell 
(ask) price differences. Therefore a HFT following a market-
making strategy will try to have a limit at the best prevailing 
prices on both sides of the order book.  
Altogether HFT strategies have become a billion-dollar industry: 
in the US they account for more than 60 % of the average daily 
volume in equities trading [18]. Although still entering the 
European market, HFT strategies are already involved in one out 
of four trades there and are expected to reach 45 % in 2012 [19]. 
 
Figure 1. Inventory evolution of a market-maker from [17] 
As trading is a zero-sum game profits of HFT traders correspond 
directly to losses of other market participants. Basically if some 
participants are able to react quicker to new information they can 
exploit limit orders of slower market participants as a kind of 
free-trading option [20].  
From an IT business evaluation perspective therefore the 
following two research questions arises [21]: What are effects of 
latency and do they require market participants to employ low 
latency technology? To provide market participants guidance in 
answering this strategy dependant question, we develop a 
performance metric to measure the impact of latency consistently 
among different combinations of markets and instruments. 
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 presents a literature 
review. The research methodology is introduced in section 3 
before section 4 describes the employed data set. Our results are 
depicted in section 6 and discussed in the following section 7. 
Finally, section 8 summarizes and concludes. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
Our research – the investigation of the impact of latency on 
securities trading – is related to two different disciplines: 
research on (i) the general value of IT and (ii) literature dealing 
with latency in the security trading domain. 
Due to the complexity in IT valuation research different attitudes 
on the economic impact of IT have been discussed [22]: one 
major research stream takes the perspective of sustainable 
competitive advantage for which IT is seen as a key resource 
[23]. At least IT investments are valued as strategic options to 
safeguard from potential future losses [21]. Nevertheless IT-
created value manifests itself in many ways [22] which might be 
intangible [24]. In the case of latency reduction technologies such 
intangible dimensions might be an improvement of execution 
quality in terms of a higher precision concerning the realization 
of targeted positions. Thus, our research focuses on the 
28
probability of relevant order book changes which occur before an 
order arrives at the market and the relation of this probability to 
different latency levels as well as time periods within a trading 
day. This constitutes a performance metric for latency. 
[25] propose that “[t]he greater the degree of competition in an 
industry, the greater the extent to which firms achieve efficiency 
gains via IT” (p. 306). Electronic securities markets exhibit a 
highly competitive character and an ongoing arms race of IT. In 
this respect our performance metric contributes particularly to 
this proposition, i.e. to which extent investments in IT in this 
field may yield competitive advantages. 
[26] states process performance to be related to business 
performance from various IS perspectives. Customers in our case, 
which are primarily institutional investors such as banks, exhibit 
tendencies for standardization, automation and flexibilization of 
IT and the supporting processes [27]. In case of the order 
submissions process our performance metric helps to assess the 
effects of automation. [8] argue that banks can yield high internal 
straight through processing rates, which implies the necessity of 
low error rates in our context, by consistent integration of all 
systems involved in the trading process. 
Within the domain of securities trading, related literature like [5] 
investigate the impact of latency reductions on market quality 
criteria like liquidity2 by the introduction of IT. That way [5] 
analyze the improved information disintermediation for off-floor 
traders from two minutes to 20 seconds at the New York Stock 
Exchange in the 1980s. Their results predict a positive effect on 
liquidity. Nevertheless, these results should be interpreted with 
care as they might be affected by other market structure changes 
during the investigation period. Current technology allows 
latencies of millisecond or sub-millisecond magnitudes. Thus 
different measurement starting and end points might distort 
results as pointed out by [3]. To overcome this problem they 
propose a standard benchmark methodology based on order 
action round trip times: it is defined as the time span from the 
order action initiation (i.e. order submission) and trading system 
response (i.e. execution confirmation) at the customer’s market 
access point. This notion is similar to our definition of latency. 
Further they analyze the properties of latency based on data from 
Deutsche Börses Xetra trading system in 2007. That way three 
drivers for latency are identified: trading activity, time of day as 
well as the distance between customer access- and market 
operator host computer. Latency exhibits different levels with a 
similar structure for every trading day (day pattern). Basically 
latency increases during the day due to rising trading activity. On 
top a remarkable latency peak can be observed at releases of US 
economic data. The mean latency is reported to amount to 51.9 
ms with a standard deviation of 25.2 ms. Their numbers provide 
a range of latencies for our analysis setup. More recent empirical 
work on the effects of latency on market quality measures are 
[28] and [20]. Unfortunately their results are ambiguous: [28] 
find that the latency reductions by the NYSE Hybrid upgrade 
cause a decrease of liquidity. In contrast the results of [20] show 
                                                             
2 A simplistic definition of liquidity is the ability of a stock 
position to be established or unwind quickly without or only 
minimal negative price movement despite its actual size [1]. 
positive effects for a Deutsche Börse system upgrade on April 
23rd, 2007 which decreases the system’s roundtrip time from 50 
ms down to 10 ms. 
Modeling the costs of latency, the working paper of [29] is also 
related to our work. In a highly stylized model the development 
of the costs of latency in US securities markets from 1995-2005 
are examined. Costs in this model only arise from limit changes 
whereas our perception of order book fluctuations includes limit 
and volume alterations. Several assumptions of the study seem 
critical in face of our results. Especially a constant arrival rate of 
impatient buyers and sellers seems unlikely considering the day 
patterns of order book fluctuation. However findings such as the 
concave effect of latency on costs are congruent with our 
findings. 
In the field of IS literature our study contributes to the research 
as it provides a performance measure on the effect of latency in 
the context of the competitive advantage of IT. Regarding the 
domain of securities trading we introduce the notion of order 
book fluctuation as the key variable which determines the latency 
impact. This differs from trading activity and volatility as these 
do not incorporate volume changes. Because algorithms tend to 
rapidly place and cancel limit orders neither trading activity nor 
volatility is affected. Whereas order book fluctuation does 
increase and latency issues arise. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Modeling the Impact of Latency 
While conceptions of latency differ not only among research 
fields but even within a research area an approach to assign 
economic value to latency can only be undertaken with respect to 
the specific business (equity trading in our case) that depends on 
latency. As described before the need for speed in today’s 
marketplaces raises the question who actually demands the low 
latency connections and what is the economic driver behind this.  
To our best knowledge so far no concept has been developed that 
attempts to assign meaningful economic numbers (amount of 
cash) to latency in this context. The phenomenon that high speed 
accesses seem to be utterly indispensible for some trading 
strategies raises the question about the effects for other traders 
without such an access. Following the argumentation of [23] 
“…a firm with a unique access to IT may be in a position to earn 
higher profits from that access” (p.124), it might well be the 
case that HFT is an example of such a unique access. While not 
only the low latency connection but also the developed 
algorithms to exploit them would define this unique access to IT. 
The following paragraphs will describe a method which aims at 
connecting latency to expected untruthfulness of information and 
deduce a metric to account for this information unreliability. In 
this respect differing concepts will be examined. However, the 
basic idea behind them is the same. Every trader, human or 
algorithmic, depends on latency. When submitting an order at t1, 
a decision has to be made about order size and volume based on 
information (usually the order book, describing current bids and 
offers at the market) generated at time t0. When the order reaches 
the market at time t2 the situation at the market might again have 
changed (c.f. Figure 2). 
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Our concepts all make use of this fact. Just based on latency 
figures alone no definitive predictions of the amount as to which 
the situation might differ between t0 and t2 can be made. Thus, it 
is impossible to conclude from a given latency whether the 
inherent risk of meanwhile market changes is small or large. 
    
Figure 2. General dependence of a trader on latency 
Since the amount of changes and the impact on ones strategy are 
unknown it is only possible to estimate the outcomes of the 
gamble which is caused by the latency lag. In the following 
subsections we present ideas how this can be done. 
3.2 Order Book Fluctuations 
Taking a closer look at the demanders of low latency trading 
connections exhibits that most orders of algorithmic trading 
especially high frequency trading concerns only the top of the 
order book [11]. Most orders issued by algorithms exactly match 
the best ask/bid price and volume and if no execution takes place 
orders are canceled immediately. Therefore we introduce the 
notion of order book fluctuation, which we define as the 
probability of a change in either the best ask or bid limit or the 
corresponding volumes at the top of the order book. Formally we 
define pfluc(x) as the probability of such a change in x 
milliseconds. This is of course a fundamentally different 
approach than to concentrate on volatility because order book 
fluctuations can occur without price changes. 
For the case that no information about trading intentions is 
available, we cannot distinguish whether they are favorable or 
unfavorable. Thus in this situation we regard any change in the 
order book as possibly negative. In the progress of this paper we 
refine this measure to 4 fundamental trading strategies, where 
only specific changes are regarded to be relevant. 
3.2.1 Global Order Book Fluctuation 
As described before, without any knowledge about a strategy, any 
change in the order book may have negative consequences, which 
a trader could not predict when he submitted the order. An 
infrastructure provider of data warehouses for traders for 
example has to decide where to place his facilities in order to 
meet his customer’s demands and she certainly has no 
information of the different trading strategies it will be used for. 
Thus in this case, for a given latency x, the probability of a 
change of the order book within this time, is the probability that 
either the limits or the volume has changed without taking care 
of the direction of that change. 
The following paragraphs will define relevant changes for four 
basic strategies. These cases are chosen rather for demonstration 
purposes of the methodology than to simulate a real application 
on a complex algorithm. However, every strategy is a 
combination of those four basic strategies. The institutional 
investor’s VWAP Buy strategy and a Market Making strategy are 
stretched out in different directions regarding the basic 







Active Passive  
Figure 3. Characteristics of typical trading strategies 
The differentiation between active and passive strategies refers 
to the application of marketable and non-marketable orders 
respectively. This is explained in more detail in the following 
subsections. 
3.2.2 Active Strategies: Buy Active, Sell Active 
We define active strategies as strategies which only uses market 
orders, i.e. orders that are executed immediately at the best 
currently available price in the order book. These orders are 
always executed, whenever a corresponding counterpart exists in 
the order book.  
Thus Buy Active is a strategy, where a trader, who wants to build 
up a position, simply submits market buy orders. After the 
submission order book changes can occur that may lead to an 
unfavorable result. It can happen that the best available offers at 
the time of the order submission are already taken either partly 
or completely cleared by the time the order reaches the book. If 
they are taken partially the order is filled only partially at the 
expected price. Then we could observe a decrease in the volume 
at the top level in the order book at the time the order reaches the 
order book. If at the time of the order arrival the ask limit has 
increased, i.e. the orders were cleared completely, the full order 
will be executed at a higher price. Accordingly relevant 
unfavorable order book changes are ask volume decreases and 
ask limit decreases.  
Analogously for a Sell Active strategy undesirable events at the 
bid side of the order book are of the same type. Volume 
decreases may lead to partial executions and inferior prices. Only 
here of course bid limit decreases are considered negative since 
the seller receives a lower price. 
3.2.3 Passive Strategies: Buy Passive, Sell Passive 
Passive strategies are those which only apply non marketable 
limit orders. A typical example could be that of a market maker 
who, like a classical money changer, makes profits by spread 
earnings from simultaneously buying and selling an asset. 
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Figure 4. Effects of latency on a trader’s order submission 
Again we distinguish between buy and sell side in order to 
determine events that are unfavorable. For a Buy Passive strategy 
which aims at buying a stock by posting bid limit orders an 
increase in the volume of the bid side during the time of order 
submission and reception by the exchange would be 
disadvantageous as the order is further behind others according 
to price/time priority in open order books. Figure 4 depicts such 
a situation. Order volumes are written in the circles. Thus the 
next incoming market order of 31 shares would execute against 
the fist two orders of 8 and 23 respectively leaving the last order 
untouched. 
Also any bid limit change can be regarded as a negative event. 
This is because the order has either been overtaken by another 
limit order with a higher bid or orders have been taken away 
leaving the order with a possibly to high limit in the order book 
and what is more with a high execution probability.  
Accordingly for the Sell Passive strategy increases in volume at 
the top of the ask side and any limit change in the ask limit are 
regarded negative.  
A summary of changes which are considered negative for the four 
basic strategies is given in Table 2. 
Table 2. Unfavorable top of the book changes 
Property / Side Buy Sell 
Active 
Ask Limit ↑ 
Ask Volume ↓ 
Bid Limit ↓ 
Bid Volume ↓ 
Passive 
Bid Limit ↕ 
Bid Volume ↑ 
Ask Limit ↕ 
Ask Volume ↑ 
3.3 Estimation  
Due to the model’s simple structure finding estimators for pfluc(x) 
is straightforward. We take the relative frequency in which order 
book changes occurred in the past. As reasonable time spans we 
will take latency in the range of those reported by [3].  
Estimators for limit and volume changes can be derived by taking 
the mean of the quoted volume and limit changes in the time 
span for which pfluc(x) is estimated. 
4. DATA SET 
The impact of latencies in magnitudes of milliseconds is of 
particular interest for algorithmic traders as even such little 
speed advantages can provide them a competitive edge. 
Algorithms require fully-electronic open central limit order books 
and a remote access via technologies like Direct Market Access 
to be applicable. Thus we choose the Xetra trading system of 
Deutsche Börse for our analysis. Typically algorithms are 
employed for instruments with high trade volumes (high 
liquidity). A proxy therefore is capitalization which is also 
utilized for index weights. Thus capitalization expresses the 
particular interest of investors for each instrument. The 30 most 
capitalized instruments in Germany are represented in the DAX. 
As expected this index exhibits on Xetra most algorithmic 
activity [3]. 
To allow a cross-sectional overview we choose 6 DAX 
constituents based on their free float market capitalization. That 
way a pair of two instruments is employed for three different 
capitalization classes: Siemens and E.ON as high; Deutsche 
Börse and Deutsche Post as medium and Salzgitter and Hannover 
Rück as low capitalized constituents (c.f. Table 3). 
The employed capitalization data (c.f. Table 3) belongs to our 
last observation day. Nevertheless it is checked to remain stable 
during the whole sample period. It is made of 10 trading days 
starting from August 31st, 2009 and ending at September 11th. 
Results remain stable for the first and second week of our sample 
implying that the 10 selected trading days are sufficient. To 
obtain unbiased results we avoided periods of extreme market 
activity by expiry dates like so called Triple Witching Days or 
high market volatility. In contrast the VDAX-New, which can be 
interpreted as a trend indicator for the volatility of the DAX, 
exhibits a stable and rather low value compared to the US sub-
prime crisis already since August 2009. 
Our data set originates from the archives of Thomson Reuters 
Data Scope Tick History. For the selected instruments all order 
book updates are retrieved. These updates consist of the first ten 
quoted limits and volumes on both sides of the book, i.e. the ten 
highest bid and ten lowest ask limits. Each change within these 
limits results in an update record. For multiple changes, 
occurring within one millisecond, we account only for the last 
one, as investors with the investigated latencies of above 1 ms 
are not able to react pointedly to such instant changes. Finally, 
we restrict our analysis to the limit and volume changes of the 
best bid/ask as algorithmic activity can be predominately found 
at the top of the book [11]. 
The focus of our investigation is set on continuous trading where 
order book changes as well as trades can occur at any times. For 
DAX instruments continuous trading takes place from 9:00 till 
13:00 o’clock in the morning and 13:02 till 17:30 in the 
afternoon. Accordingly order book updates for auctions are 
removed and validity times of the last limit updates before 
auctions adjusted appropriately. Unfortunately, our data lacks 
secured information on volatility interruptions. But as this 
mechanism to switch from continuous trading to an auction 
results in one limit change per interruption and occurs seldom, 
its effects are expected to be smoothed out by the multitude of 
order book updates observed. 
Table 3 depicts the basic characteristics of the data set described 
above: besides the free float market capitalizations for our three 
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classes, mean lifetimes of top of the book situations, fractions of  
Table 3. DAX order book data sample characteristics 
limit and volume changes as well as the mean quoted volume 
for the best bid/ask are depicted. No general conclusion can be 
drawn that lower capitalized instruments’ best bid/ask limits 
and volumes exhibit lower lifetimes. Nevertheless standard 
deviations of lifetimes are generally high and increase for lower 
capitalizations. Further, there are about twice to four times 
more volume than limit changes. Basically the fraction of limit 
changes increases with lower capitalizations. This is obvious as 
lower capitalizations come along with lower quoted volumes 
and thus induce more trades to completely remove the volume 
of the targeted limit level. As limit price changes come 
generally along with different volumes the depicted numbers 
reflect only such volume changes without simultaneous limit 
alterations. 
5. MEASUREMENT AND RESULTS 
5.1 Measurement 
For our goal to find a universal and neutral measure for the 
impact of latency we try to assume as few as possible 
restrictions by a specific trading strategy. Consequently our 
measurement procedures are not based on strategy specific 
information such as: when an individual trader submits orders, 
receives executions, which kind of orders are used or how 
harmful unexecuted orders for her strategy might be. Instead 
we take a general perspective and aim at investigating the 
expected probability of relevant order book alterations as well 
as the expected magnitude of such alterations. 
Further, as we expect day patterns within our data, trading days 
are divided into investigation intervals: the shorter these 
intervals the more flicker arises whereas longer interval 
potentially might smooth out patterns. Therefore we checked 
different interval lengths. Overall the found patterns remain 
stable. For the illustration below an exemplary interval length 
of 15 minutes is chosen. 
For each interval of a trading day (34 for a length of 15 
minutes) we calculated the probability of being hit by an order 
book change within a given latency delay. This is carried out 
for any change for the strategy independent measure and for 
relevant changes for the four simple strategies as described in 
sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. Besides the magnitude in volume and 
limit price changes at the top of the book (i.e. for the best-
bid/ask limits) are calculated.  
For all calculations we applied a sliding window. It compares 
the order book situation at a time mi with that after an assumed 
latency delay x milliseconds later, i.e. at mi + x. This window 
slides through every millisecond of an interval. In every 
millisecond where we can find a relevant change after x 
milliseconds we increase our number of relevant observations 
by one. At the end of each interval we divide the number of 
observations by the amount of milliseconds in that interval, i.e. 
900,000 ms in case of 15 min interval. As an estimator for the 
probability of a (relevant) order book change we take the 
average of the ten trading days for each interval of those ratios. 
Because an order could be submitted in any millisecond this 
ratio estimates the probability of being hit by an order book 
change when submitting an order at any time in the interval. 
Variations of the window size which simulates our latency 
delay are set from 5 to 100 ms in 5 ms steps to assess latency 
impacts over typical traders’ latency experiences [3]. 
Additionally, latencies of 1 and 2 ms are included to focus 
border cases. To assess the impact of those changes we also 
measured the average limit and volume changes within those 
time spans. 
Limit price changes typically come along with volume changes. 
Thus we only account for such volume alterations where the 
limit price remains unchanged to avoid overestimations of the 
alteration probability. 
5.2 Day Pattern in Order Book Fluctuations 
As expected the probability of alterations clearly shows a 
significant day pattern. The trend of the average probability for 
our four basic strategies and the overall measure of limit and 
volume changes for a latency of 10 ms is depicted in Figure 5. 
Basically one can see that all 5 lines exhibit the same form that 
is only shifted upwards or downwards. As the top line in the 
graph accounts for all kind of changes it takes the highest 
probabilities. The two next lines represent the passive 
(buy/sell) strategies and the two last with the lowest 
probabilities correspond to the active (buy/sell) strategies. 
Obviously there are no striking differences among the buy/sell 
pairs of active or passive strategies as the corresponding best-
bid/ask limits are symmetric around the instruments midpoint. 
Further, the fact that passive strategies exhibit higher 
probabilities to be effected by order book alterations is due to 
the fact that they account for three kinds of changes whereas 
active strategies do only for two. 
Concerning the overall trend all five lines share a modified U-




Free Float Market 
Capitalization [m€] 
 Order Book Top 
Lifetime [ms]  Fraction of Changes [%]  Mean Quoted Volume [€] 
 Mean Std. Dev.  Limits  Volumes   Best Bid Best Ask 
High 
E.ON 57,829  1,129 2,758  19.91 80.09  94,911 96,184 
Siemens 52,070  860 2,342  30.55 69.45  60,205 60,263 
Medium 
Deutsche Börse 10,902  925 3,216  35.30 64.70  30,645 28,381 
Deutsche Post 10,673  1,507 4,168  21.45 78.55  51,268 45,798 
Low 
Salzgitter 2,673  1,255 4,189  34.42 65.58  22,849 22,975 
Hannover Rück 1,785  4,020 10,085  33.25 66.75  23,914 25,052 
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Thus, in the morning the probability of order book alteration is 
high and decreases continuously. It reaches its minimum just 
after the midday-auction. Then it increases again. Different to 
typical volume U-shapes it falls sharply again at ~14:30. Then a 
striking large increase occurs at approx. 15:30. This is 
congruent with the opening time of the US markets. 
The line with the highest probabilities represents the case, 
where any change in the order book is viewed as 
disadvantageous. As stated before this is an entirely strategy 
independent measure which could be useful for an 
infrastructure provider, who does not have access to any 
information about the algorithms that use the infrastructure. 
 
Figure 5. Order book alteration in the course of the trading 
day for Siemens and 10 ms latency. 
5.3 Latency Impact  
The length of the latency delay has of course an impact on the 
probability that the order book situation changes in a way that 
seems unfavorable for a submitted order. A first hint as to how 
much this influences the pattern can be seen in Figure 6. 
The graph shows the day patterns for 10 to 100 ms for a Buy 
Active strategy in E.ON. The lowest line represents the 
probabilities for a 10 ms delay, the next higher line 20 ms etc. 
We omit the 5 ms step here for demonstration purpose. It can 
already be seen at this point that the day pattern is not only 
preserved but even amplified by the latency effect. 
In consideration of this fact latency impact is examined for 
every 15 min interval separately. In every interval the effect of 
latency on the probability of unfavorable order book changes 
shows a typical slightly concave relation. This concave effect on 
the probability can be found in any interval across all stocks 
and for all strategies in our sample. The graph in Figure 7 
depicts the average increase of probabilities for a Buy Active 
strategy in E.ON. The empiric values can be fitted with a log-
linear regression. 
From the slope of this regression we can deduce the following 
simple rule of thumb. A 1 % increase in latency leads to a 0.9 
% increase in the probability of unfavorable order book 
changes. 
Thus reducing latency about 1 ms has a greater effect on the 
probability the lower the latency already is. Due to data 
restrictions our study only covers latencies from 1 ms upwards. 
However, with more accurate data and an extension in the 
submillisecond area this might provide an additional 
explanation why high investments in relatively small 
improvements in latency can be found in the market. 
 





Figure 7. Scaling of hit probability due to latency 
5.4 The influence of market capitalization 
As depicted in the introduction heavily traded stocks will be 
more prone to latency risk. Since market capitalization is a 
fairly good proxy for the interest of traders in the stock (c.f. 
section 4) we expect highly capitalized stocks to exhibit a 
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higher probability and a higher latency impact than lower 
capitalized ones.  
Figure 8 clearly confirms this assumption. Highly capitalized 
stock’s probability of unfavorable order book changes is on 
average twice as high than those of low capitalized stocks. The 
figure shows the day patterns of probabilities for a Buy Active 
strategy and a latency of 50 ms for the three classes “Low”, 
“Medium” and “High” capitalization.  
 
Figure 8. Hit rate for our three capitalization classes 
5.5 Average Limit and Volume Changes 
Though day patterns are common for limits, prices, spreads and 
volumes in stock trading, it remains unclear how changes of 
limits and volumes within latency delay evolve over time. 
Among others e.g. [30, 31] find typical U-shape of trading 
volumes. This is congruent with our results. However the risk 
that one faces due to latency rather depends on the amount of 
changes in volumes within the order book than on the overall 
trading volume.  
To our best knowledge we do not know any study that 
examined the average amount by which limit and volume 
change. In order to combine information of those changes with 
the probabilities from the previous paragraphs, we use the same 
sliding window measurement method as before. That is, we 
compare the limits and volumes after an assumed latency delay 
and take the average after every 15 min. Limit decreases are 
measured relatively in basis points (1 bps = 0.01 %) to allow 
for comparisons among different stocks. 
In case of volume changes we could not find any significant 
trend which is stable over all stocks and trading days, whereas 
limit changes show a significant decrease in a trading day. 
Therefore for a typical volume change one should take the 
average for the whole trading day as an approximation. 
Changes in limits tend to be higher in the morning than in the 
evening. As described before limit changes are higher in the 
morning. A typical example is shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Evolution of limit changes in E.ON 
The graph shows the sum of absolute values of changes in bid 
limits in basis points, averaged over ten trading days in E.ON. 
The line is that of the linear regression that exhibit a highly 
significant p-value (at the 1 % level or more) for all cases, 
except for Hannover Rück, where significance can only be 
found at the 10 % level.3 
Interestingly this does not reflect a typical U-shaped volatility 
pattern. But since limit changes do not necessarily reflect price 
changes this does not contradict results concerning price 
volatility. 
6. DISCUSSION 
6.1 Impact on Active Strategies  
For market or marketable limit orders, i.e. the means to 
implement an active strategy, two unfavorable situations can be 
encountered (c.f. Table 2): an unfavorable movement of the 
limit price or a decrease of its volume. To assess their impact 
we make use of probabilities discussed in the last section. For 
actual executions the assessment of limit price changes is 
straight forward as they can be directly converted into costs. 
Therefore we take the probability of such changes times the 










As we have encountered significant trends within the limit 
changes (c.f. section 5.5) and day patterns for the probability to 
be hit by them (c.f. section 5.2) we calculate these figures for 
each interval. Again we encountered a U-shape for the expected 
limit change costs. An overview of their magnitudes is provided 
in Table 4 for an Active Buy strategy and an assumed latency of 
50 ms. The latency cost impact ranges between 0.01 and 0.06 
                                                             
3 Changes in ask limits reveal the same tendency. Significant 
decreases can be found for all stocks except for Salzgitter.  
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bps. Basically differences among instruments highly depend on 
the proportion of unfavorable limit price to volume changes. 
This is also the rationale behind the low figures for the highly 
capitalized instruments E.ON and Siemens. 
Table 4. Buy executions limit change costs – 50 ms latency 
Instrument 
Limit Change Costs [bps] 
Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
E.ON 0.0133 0.0509 0.0275 0.0114 
Siemens 0.0140 0.0617 0.0310 0.0140 
Deutsche Börse 0.0188 0.0625 0.0382 0.0113 
Deutsche Post 0.0124 0.0522 0.0280 0.0109 
Salzgitter 0.0150 0.0453 0.0263 0.0084 
Hannover Rück 0.0093 0.0363 0.0186 0.0077 
Overall (Average) 0.0093 0.0625 0.0282 0.0126 
 
Overall this part of the latency impact costs is low compared to 
typical implicit trading costs (i.e. market impact, timing or 
opportunity costs). Nevertheless for strategies yielding only low 
profits per trade, like those of HFTs, these figures become 
relevant: for example the US HFT Tradeworx [16] reports 
average net earnings of 0.1 cent per traded share. With an 
average share price of 41.84 $ within the S&P 500 this 
corresponds to net earnings of 0.24 bps. Hence, the sole limit 
change impact for an active strategy with latencies of 50 ms 
might diminish their profits by as much as 26 %. 
While market and marketable orders face the costs described 
above in case of executions, it can also happen that due to 
latency marketable orders cannot be executed. For this situation 
no direct costs can be associated but a loss of immediacy. 
Depending on the underlying strategy cost of immediacy need 
to be assigned if one wants to model the limit change costs 
completely. 
For the second component of the latency impact, i.e. decreasing 
volume, exact cost figures cannot be calculated without 
knowledge of the underlying strategy either. Nevertheless our 
figures show that e.g. in E.ON an average volume decrease of 
29 % occurs with a probability of 1.7 – 6.7 % depending on the 
order submission day time. This is particularly harmful for 
algorithms which aim at taking advantage of promising trade 
opportunities as much as possible. For Xetra we know that 76.7 
% of all orders that exactly match the best bid/asks and volume 
are submitted by algorithms [11]. Further, 17.7 % of such 
orders submitted by algorithms succeed in match the best 
bid/ask and volume. 
6.2 Impact on Passive Strategies 
Limit and volume changes result in wrong positioning of the 
submitted limit order in the order book. For an exemplary buy 
order a best ask limit increase the order is placed too far up the 
book, whereas decreases lead to a position below the top. At 
last the volume effect is opposite to that of the active strategies. 
An increase in the volume of the top of the order book puts the 
limit order at a more distant position regarding the price/time 
priority thus diminishing the execution probability. This effect 
has already been illustrated in Figure 4. The targeted position 
is taken by another order that entered the book within the 
latency delay. The submitted order is now behind this order. 
The next incoming order that triggers a trade will be matched 
against this order before the submitted order. It may well 
happen that this effect hinders submitted orders to be executed 
at all when marketable sell order volumes are small. 
Passive strategies aim at saving or earning the spread, i.e. they 
seek price improvement at the cost of execution probability. 
The latency effect decreases the execution probability. 
Therefore the low latency trader can seek more price 
improvements than a trader who has to bear high latency. Our 
figures show that volume changes occur far more often than 
limit changes (c.f. Table 3), in our sample up to four times 
more often. This is not captured in volatility or other standard 
parameters usually reported for stocks. 
In this study we calculated the probabilities of the occurrence of 
relevant volume and limit changes. The impact of latency can 
in this respect be regarded as an impact on the error rate of 
order submission. 
Mean volume increases are about 147.7 % with a standard 
deviation of 73.5 %. But the maximum of 15 min average 
volume changes we found was (at 9:15-9:30 for Hannover 
Rück) 583.5 %. E.g. a trader with a latency of 50 ms has to 
expect for E.ON that there is a 2.9 % chance that her order will 
be “overtaken” by another incoming limit orders increasing the 
existing volume by 147.7 %. 
Since it would be desirable to assign costs to these numbers, 
strategy independent models need to be applied to assess the 
impact of those effects on execution probabilities and then to 
convert these into trading costs. This extension is not in the 
scope of this study but builds an interesting field of future 
work. 
As mentioned in data section an extension towards more 
instruments, other markets and the sub millisecond granularity 
constitutes a potential course for further research.   
7. CONCLUSION 
This paper examines the effects of latency in securities trading. 
Based on data for DAX30 instruments traded at Xetra 
fluctuations at the top of the order book are analyzed. These 
fluctuations encompass limit and volume changes. To assess 
their impact on securities trading four fundamental strategies 
are dealt with. 
Concerning our first research question on the effects of latency 
we show that latency impact differs significantly among 
instruments: in general highly capitalized stocks exhibit higher 
probabilities to encounter unfavorable order book changes 
during the latency delay than lower capitalized ones. Among 
fluctuations volume changes occur twice to four times more 
often than limit alterations. Further, for all strategies a 
significant day pattern for the probability of unfavorable 
changes is found. Thereby, passive strategies based on non 
marketable limit orders are more often affected by order book 
changes than active ones. For commonly observed latencies at 
Xetra (1 to 100 ms) the dependence of probabilities for 
unfavorable events turns out to be nonlinearly increasing with 
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latency. Nevertheless they can be fairly well approximated by a 
log-linear regression. 
Concerning the scale of relative changes, limit alterations 
significantly decrease over the trading day whereas for volumes 
no common day trend can be found. Limit increases and 
decreases are symmetric. Further, volume increases are 
typically higher than decreases, which is obvious as decreases 
cannot exceed 100 %. 
To answer our second research questions, whether these latency 
effects require market participants to employ low latency 
technology, we investigated four fundamental trading 
strategies. For these the calculation of directly associated cost 
is only applicable for active ones. Passive strategies cannot be 
associated with direct costs without further assumptions 
regarding the true underlying trading strategy. In this case we 
present average latency effects regarding the limit and volume 
effect market participants face. That way buy and sell strategies 
do not exhibit significant deviations. 
From an exchange’s customer perspective the following 
conclusions can be drawn: for each individual retail investor, 
who cannot make use of low latency technologies, price effects 
are neglectable. Also volume effects seem irrelevant as retail 
trade sizes are typically low compared to quoted best bid/ask 
volumes. For institutional investors the answer depends on 
their business model: basically for algorithmic traders latency 
effects yield low increases of error rates. For investors whose 
business follows long term profits this latency effects seem 
bearable. In contrast the lower the profits associated to each 
trade are the more fatal these effects become. 
Future research steps should include an extension of the cost 
analysis to passive strategies and the volume effect of active 
strategies. Therefore it should aim at incorporating estimations 
for execution probabilities and models for the cost of 
immediacy. 
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